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TACTICAL ESCALATION
IN RURAL CHINA1
Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang
F ORMS OF CONTENTION generally have alimited lifespan. Even the most creativetactics tend, over time, to lose their
power to surprise opponents and stir followers.
Tactical escalation offers a means to regain
momentum when established techniques of
protest no longer create the sense of crises and
excitement they once did. As the effectiveness
of familiar methods wanes, enterprising acti-
vists sometimes turn to more disruptive acts to
demonstrate their commitment, leave their op-
ponents rattled, and mobilize supporters.2 Al-
though confrontational tactics can at times
alienate the public and generate a backlash
[Rochon 1988], they can also help draw new-
comers to a cause [Jasper 1997: 248] while
offering leverage to actors who have few other
resources [Piven and Cloward 1992].
Tactical escalation typically involves dra-
matic gestures and provocations that test the
vulnerabilities of one’s foes. It may appear in
the form of a single tactic (e.g. the sit-in, the
mock shantytown, the suffrage parade) that vi-
vidly symbolizes injustice and is difficult for
the authorities and onlookers to ignore. Or it
may arise as a cluster of related innovations
[Voss and Sherman 2000] that reflects a fresh
approach to protest and signals a new “tactical
grammar” [Ennis 1987: 531] is at work.
In rural China, much like it did during the
American Civil Rights Movement, revitalizing
the repertoire of contention has entailed a
radicalization of tactics – a move from hum-
ble petitioning to the politics of disruption
[McAdam 1983: 738]. In places such as Heng-
yang county, Hunan, rightful resistance has
become far more confrontational over the last
decade, as the mediated tactics of the past are
being demoted or adapted and more direct
protest routines are on the rise.
In its basic form, rightful resistance is a ra-
ther tame form of contention that makes use
of existing (if clogged) channels of participa-
tion and relies heavily on the patronage of elite
backers. It is mediated in the sense that
complainants do not directly confront their op-
ponents, but instead rely on a powerful third
party to address their claims. Activists at this
point always act under the sufferance of, and
energetically seek support from 1) officials as
high as central policy makers, 2) cadres as low
as any local official other than the ones they
are denouncing, and 3) journalists (or others)
who can communicate their grievances to
1. The editors would like to thank Cambridge University
Press for allowing Études rurales to reproduce this text,
published as the Chapter IV (“Tactical Escalation”) of
the following book: Kevin J. O’Brien and L. Li, Rightful
Resistance in Rural China, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
2. On the advantages of unruliness, see K. Andrews
[2001], W.A. Gamson [1990], M. Giugni [1999: 23-33]
and S. Tarrow [1998: 163, chap. 6].
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high-ranking authorities. In this basic form,
rightful resisters may mobilize popular action,
but their main aim is to use the threat of unrest
to attract attention from possible mediators and
to apply pressure on officeholders at higher le-
vels to rein in their underlings. Protest leaders,
in other words, seek to bypass their adversaries
rather than to compel them to negotiate.
Direct action is quite different. In Heng-
yang county, for instance, activists increa-
singly place demands on their targets in person
and try to wring concessions from them on-
the-spot. This form of rightful resistance does
not depend on high-level intercession, but on
skilled rabble-rousers and the popular pressure
they can muster. Although protest organizers
still cite central policies, rather than sounding
“fire alarms” [McCubbins and Schwarz 1984]
they (and the villagers who join them) try to
put out the fires themselves – they enforce ra-
ther than inform. In direct rightful resistance,
though activists may still view the Center as a
source of legitimacy, a symbolic backer, and
a guarantor against repression, they no longer
genuinely expect higher-ups to intervene on
their behalf. Instead, they regard themselves
and their supporters to be capable of resolving
the problems at hand. Acting as ever in
the name of faithful policy implementation,
rightful resisters now confront their targets
(often face-to-face) and mobilize as much po-
pular action as they can to induce them to halt
policy violations. Direct action, in the end,
relies on appeals to the community rather
than to higher level authorities and its goal is
immediate concessions.
This article will begin by examining some
of the forms that direct rightful resistance takes
in rural China. Then we will move on to a series
of questions suggested by the broader literature
on tactical innovation, including: are these tac-
tics truly new and how widespread are they?
Who is mainly responsible for initiating direct
action, newcomers or seasoned complainants?
And, most importantly, why is tactical escala-
tion occurring? Along the way we will alight on
a number of explanations for tactical change,
including ones that underscore the role of prior
experiences with contention, resources, and
popular support.
It is worth mentioning that studies of tac-
tical innovation usually concentrate on how a
repertoire of contention evolves rather than
why certain tactics are chosen [Jasper 1997:
234; Brown 2003]. We tread a middle path
here, emphasizing both external forces that
structure the options open to rightful resisters
and internal factors that sometimes lead them
to make tactical decisions that attention to the
environment alone would never predict. We
derive most of our conclusions from interviews
with rural protest organizers about actions they
have taken and why they thought certain tac-
tics were effective or not.3 We also draw on
government reports that detail episodes of po-
pular unrest, other written accounts, and our
own earlier field research.
Three Variants of Direct Action
Mediated contention is a form of seeking grace
from intercessors whose characteristic expres-
sion is group petitioning. Direct action, on the
3. On the advantages of interviewing over after-the-fact
theorizing, see M.M. Brown [2003].
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contrary, rests on a public rallying call and
high-pressure methods that are designed to
coax local leaders to revoke an illegal decision.
When employing direct tactics, protesters and
their supporters assert a right to resist (not only
expose and denounce) unlawful acts.
In contemporary rural China, direct action
has three main variants. The least confronta-
tional might be called publicizing a policy. In
the course of “studying” or “disseminating do-
cuments,” activists make known or distribute
materials which (they contend) show that
county, township, or village cadres have vio-
lated a central or provincial directive. They do
so for the purpose of alerting the public to of-
ficial misconduct and mobilizing opposition to
unapproved “local policies.” The documents
they select always relate to issues that concern
villagers greatly, be it reducing excessive taxes
and fees, decrying the use of violence, or pro-
moting well-run village elections. In Heng-
yang county alone, activists have publicized
the following materials: President Jiang
Zemin’s 1998 speech on reducing “peasant
burdens,”4 Hunan Provincial Document No. 9
(1996) on the same subject [Yu 2001: 559],
and the 1993 Agriculture Law, especially its
clauses (Arts. 18, 19, 59) that forbid imposing
unlawful fees, affirm the right of villagers to
“reject” unsanctioned exactions, and stipulate
that higher levels should work to halt such im-
positions and have them returned to villagers.
Participants in direct action use a variety of
methods to make beneficial policies known
and to mobilize resistance to their violation.
They may begin by showing government
papers they have acquired to their neighbors.
The most inconspicuous way to do this is in
a private home. A somewhat more overt
approach involves photocopying central or
provincial documents and then handing or sel-
ling them to interested villagers. One activist
in Hengyang proudly explained that he
charged his neighbors precisely what he paid
the copy shop and actually lost a fair sum when
some villagers walked off with photocopied
documents without reimbursing him.
As their confidence mounts, rightful resis-
ters may turn to more public ways to expose
local misconduct. An example of this is
playing tape recordings, or even using mega-
phones or loudspeakers, to inform villagers of
beneficial policies. In Henan, for instance, in
response to township manipulation of village
elections and increasing exactions, a young
man from Suiping county used a megaphone
to acquaint his fellow villagers with the Or-
ganic Law of Villagers’ Committees (1998)
and central directives prohibiting excessive
taxes and fees [Hao and Chen 2002].5 In Heng-
yang county, a middle-aged shop-owner went
a step further and was detained and beaten by
township authorities for his cheekiness. He
rented some audio equipment, set it up on his
roof, and aired central and provincial
4. Wang Xinqing, Liu Zhenying, Wang Yanbin and
Jiang Xia, “Zhongyang nongcun gongzuo huiyi zai Jing
zhaokai” (The Central Meeting on the Countryside Held
in Beijing), Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 1998,
January 10.
5. On an activist posting copies of a State Council di-
rective (which warned local governments against the il-
legal use of land) on the walls of his Zhejiang village,
see J. Yu [2003]. The man claimed that “all [he] did was
tell people what their legal rights were.”
. . .
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documents about easing peasant burdens to his
entire village.
Disseminating policies need not employ
even the simplest technology and can occur at
unexpected times, as is seen when resourceful
activists appropriate apolitical rituals or cele-
brations and turn them to their own ends. In
rural Hengyang for instance, rightful resisters
hijacked a traditional dragon dance during
Spring Festival (three consecutive years) to pu-
blicize central documents granting villagers a
right to reject unreasonable burdens and (on
the sly) to solicit donations for their cause.
While parading up and down every lane, they
summarized the “spirit of central documents”
in rhymed verse, chanting in unison as they
wound their way from home to home.
Many efforts to make beneficial policies
known are limited to a single village; others
expand the field of action. An example of the
latter is employing “propaganda vehicles” or
putting up posters throughout a township cri-
ticizing excessive fees or rigged elections. One
activist in Hengyang, already famous for or-
ganizing a road blockade in 1999, rented a
truck and used it as a mobile broadcasting sta-
tion to transmit provincial directives limiting
rural taxation to a number of small hamlets
scattered throughout his township [Johnson
2004: 63, 67, 71]. Another protest leader, after
participating in an expensive and fruitless col-
lective complaint to the Hunan provincial go-
vernment in 1996, copied excerpts of central
documents calling for tax and fee reductions
on large posters and had a group of young
villagers paste them up around the county.
For many of these tactics, the intended au-
dience does not have to make any special
effort. They can stay indoors, open their win-
dows and listen, or simply walk outside and
watch what is going on. One variety of dis-
semination that involves a more direct (if
surreptitious) effort to attract a crowd is pre-
senting a movie and then publicizing benefi-
cial policies moments before the show begins.
In Henan, as early as 1993, a villager did this
with a State Council regulation that limited
township and village fees [Yu 1993]. Activists
may also inform villagers about poor imple-
mentation at rural markets. This again, in-
volves taking advantage of a ready-made
audience. According to several Hengyang pro-
test organizers, on market days they sometimes
simply set up a loudspeaker in the town center
and read out documents concerning tax and fee
reduction that were issued by the Center,
Hunan province, or Hengyang city [Yu 2001:
555]. In such cases, even though rightful re-
sisters may do their best to minimize confron-
tation, clashes frequently occur after local
officials appear. Township cadres, when they
heard the Hengyang activists disclosing fee li-
mits on a busy market day in 1998, first cut
off electricity to their loudspeaker. But a sym-
pathetic restaurant owner stepped in and sup-
plied the villagers with a generator. Then, a
number of officials came out of their offices
and ordered the protesters to disperse, only to
find themselves upbraided for impeding the
lawful dissemination of central policies.
Although they usually shy away from phy-
sical confrontation with their adversaries, po-
licy disseminators sometimes publicize
policies in ways that cannot help but lead to
conflict. One technique sure to produce offi-
cial ire is distributing documents near a
. . .
172
Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang
government compound. A Hengyang activist
for example, excerpted central directives limi-
ting peasant burdens on large, red posters and
plastered them on several buildings in the
township government complex. Protest orga-
nizers in Jiangxi have likewise sold pamphlets
about Beijing’s fee reduction policies directly
in front of a Party office building [Ding 2001:
433-434]. In both cases, these tactics cornered
township officials, heightened their fears that
further popular action was imminent, and led
to a swift (and negative) response. In Heng-
yang, township cadres removed the posters; in
Jiangxi, the book sellers were arrested.
By far the most assertive form of publici-
zing policies involves both deliberate confron-
tation and undisguised mass mobilization.
One common tactic employed in Hengyang is
to trail behind township tax collectors as they
try to collect fees, all the time loudly quoting
tax reduction directives. This practice not only
challenges the legality of an exaction, it also
often draws scores of onlookers and encou-
rages less daring villagers to withhold their
payments. Another highly provocative form of
propagating policies involves calling so-called
“ten thousand-person meetings” in a govern-
ment compound to study policies that exco-
riate corruption or limit fees. Such gatherings
can rapidly turn into melees when township
or county officials intervene. In Hengyang, a
protest leader organized a mass meeting to
force a rollback in taxes and fees. To sym-
bolize the activists’ willingness to challenge
the township head-on, the speaker’s podium
was placed just steps away from the main go-
vernment office building. Hundreds of villa-
gers were invited to attend the rally and the
organizers planned to detain and deliver to the
city authorities any township official who
ventured to interfere. In another widely-re-
ported episode in Ningxiang county, Hunan,
after a multi-village band of “Volunteer Pro-
pagandists for the Policy of Reducing Bur-
dens” used tape recorders and hired a
loudspeaker truck in 1999 to tell villagers
about their rights, protest organizers assem-
bled 4,000 people outside the town govern-
ment complex to demand adherence to central
and provincial directives that capped taxation
and opposed corruption. But before the spea-
kers could say a word, the assembled villagers
rushed into the compound. Over 1,000 police
and 500 soldiers dispersed the demonstrators,
using clubs and tear gas. Many villagers were
arrested or injured, and 1 man was killed
[Bernstein and Lü 2003: 128-129].
Publicizing documents does not always
lead to repression; it can sometimes further
protesters’ ends. By reading out or distributing
central policies, activists expose unlawful ac-
tions, shatter information blockades, and de-
monstrate (both to officials and interested
bystanders) that it may be possible to muster
large-scale resistance to local misconduct.6 In
so doing, rightful resisters assert their right to
know about beneficial measures and to
communicate their knowledge to others. Ordi-
nary villagers may be emboldened to join
6. For urban workers in China who “are no longer simply
presenting their grievances to those in charge, but publi-
cizing them,” see A. Kernen [2003a: 5]. On their being
“not only concerned with handing over a petition to the
authorities, but also with inserting their claims into the
‘public arena’”, see A. Kernen [2003b: 9].
. . .
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them, or at least support them, not simply be-
cause they have been made aware that central
directives have been neglected, but because
they have seen fellow community members
take the lead in standing up to unlawful local
actions. As we will see in the next chapter,
when a campaign of dissemination unfolds,
formerly-uninvolved villagers sometimes be-
come much less timid insomuch as they ob-
serve new “peasant leaders” emerging and a
weakening of the local government’s usual
stranglehold over political life.
The second variant of direct action is “de-
manding a dialogue.” Activists and their sup-
porters, often after collective petitioning or
publicizing a policy fails to budge their foes,
may insist on face-to-face meetings with local
officials (or their proxies) to urge immediate
revocation of unlawful local measures.
Rightful resisters have used this tactic in Heng-
yang most notably to fight mounting school
fees. Since many townships can no longer col-
lect as much revenue as they used to (owing
both to pressure from above and resistance
from below), and many poorer districts are fi-
nancially-starved in the wake of the 1994 fiscal
reforms, township leaders have frequently
allowed local schoolmasters to increase edu-
cational fees on their own.7 Self-styled
“burden-reduction representatives,” usually
after hard-pressed parents come to them for
help, may demand that all overcharges be re-
turned. Instead of lodging a collective
complaint, which would have been more
common in the past, a group of representatives
may proceed directly to the school. The arrival
of these “peasant heroes” typically attracts a
large crowd, not least because the parents who
invited them often encourage onlookers to
come, support them, and watch the drama un-
fold. In one such incident in Hengyang, the
lead activist requested a face-to-face meeting
with the head of a township middle school. In
front of a large assembly of local residents, he
displayed documents issued by the city and
county education bureau that fixed fees at a
certain level and told the schoolmaster item by
item how much more students had been
charged. The presence of nearly 20 hardened
“burden reduction representatives,” as well as
over 100 bystanders, led to a round of intense
bargaining, after which the schoolmaster
agreed to return about 80% of the illegal
charges.
But events do not always unfold so peace-
fully. On another occasion also in Hengyang,
a school head postponed a scheduled dialogue
so that he would have time to hire a group of
local toughs to scare off the “burden reduction
representatives.” But when the meeting began
and the schoolmaster signaled his men to make
their move, an elderly bystander came to the
defense of the representatives. He said he ad-
mired their altruism and would protect them
to the end.
“Demanding a dialogue” has also been em-
ployed against far more powerful targets than
local school heads. In Qidong county, Hunan,
a riot occurred in July 1996 in which hundreds
of people attacked township and village offi-
cials and smashed the signboards of the
7. Beginning in 2001, the Center began increasing rural
education funding significantly [Bernstein 2003]. Whe-
ther this defuses conflicts between school masters and
villagers remains to be seen.
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township government. (Destroying the pla-
cards that identify government offices is a
symbolic denial of their legitimacy, much like
burning a flag or effigy.) The county Party se-
cretary rushed to the area to look into what had
caused the unrest. At the urging of hundreds
of villagers, he agreed to have an unlawfully-
collected education surcharge rescinded. The
incident ended, but news of the successful pro-
test spread rapidly. Upon learning of it, villa-
gers in other parts of Qidong county were
inspired to rise up and demand dialogues. In
early September 1996 3 activists arranged a
movie presentation in order to read out a
Hunan provincial document that reduced pea-
sant burdens, to organize villagers to resist ex-
cessive education apportionments, and to
gather signatures for a petition to present to
the township. After the video ended, just be-
fore a group of indignant movie-goers set out
for a nearby government compound, a skir-
mish broke out with township officials who
had come to dissuade the protesters from de-
monstrating. Two days later, over 600 villa-
gers, carrying banners and flags, beating drums
and gongs, and setting off fireworks, paraded
down the busiest street in the township to the
main office building to insist on a meeting with
the Party secretary and government head. Over
the next three days, hundreds of villagers from
four other townships in Qidong marched to
their township seats and demanded dialogues
with Party and government leaders [Yu 2001:
558-560].
If publicizing a policy aims to remind er-
rant cadres that they are vulnerable to rightful
claims, demanding a dialogue is directed at
unresponsive targets who refuse to back
down. At this stage, negotiation and compro-
mise are still possible, even desired by acti-
vists. Cool bargaining and face-saving
concessions become distinctly less feasible
when protesters turn to the third variant of
direct action: face-to-face defiance.
Activists who use this tactic confront local
officials on the job and try to halt any illegal
acts. They, for example, flatly reject unautho-
rized impositions and loudly encourage others
to follow suit. In Hengyang in 1998, one par-
ticularly feisty rightful resister followed
township tax collectors wherever they went.
With two other “burden reduction representa-
tives” at his side, he brandished a copy of a
central directive and contested every effort to
collect even a yuan (12 US cents) too much.
The tax collectors dared not challenge him in
public, but one of them muttered an insult after
he refused to get out of their way and let them
do their job. A scuffle broke out and hundreds
of villagers came to defend the fee resister,
eventually pinning the beleaguered taxman in
his jeep. That same year a similar incident oc-
curred in another township in Hengyang
county. Two “burden-reduction representa-
tives” had locked horns with township revenue
collectors when they tried to prevent the col-
lection of several unauthorized fees. When the
officials struck one of the representatives with
a flashlight, a shoving match broke out. Again,
angry villagers responded, this time overtur-
ning two jeeps the township cadres used for
their work.
Rightful resisters may also use face-to-face
defiance to challenge rigged elections. In one
dramatic episode in the early 1990s, a group of
villagers in Hubei successfully disrupted a
. . .
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villagers’ committee election in which nomina-
tions were not handled according to approved
procedures. Just as the ballots were being dis-
tributed, one villager leapt to the platform
where the election committee was presiding,
grabbed a microphone and shouted:
Xiong Dachao is a corrupt cadre. Don’t
vote for him.
Immediately several of his confederates
stood up and started shouting words of support,
seconding his charges. To further dramatize
their resistance, the assembled protesters then
tore up their own ballots as well as those of
other villagers who were milling about waiting
to vote.8
Public-minded intellectuals sometimes urge
on direct action. The following episode in-
volved both disseminating policies and face-
to-face defiance. In Jiangxi, the deputy editor
of a rural affairs journal published 12,000 co-
pies of a Work Manual on Reducing Farmers’
Tax Burdens. He later said:
I was just carrying out my duty to help far-
mers personally monitor arbitrary fees, and
at the end of the day, central government
policies are not enough to help the farmers.
They need to be able to help themselves.
The book had a section advising farmers
how to seek redress and its subtitle was “The
imperial sword is in your hands, farmer
friends, hold on tight!” Although the editor ul-
timately lost his position and the provincial go-
vernment dispatched the police to confiscate
as many copies of the book as they could lo-
cate, the story received national attention in the
newspaper Southern Weekend (Nanfang
Zhoumo) [Gilley 2001; Yang 2001: 39; Wang
2002: 6; O’Brien and Li 2004: 78].
The three variants of direct action described
here are interrelated and often appear together.
In addition, rightful resisters sometimes em-
ploy them in sequence, starting by publicizing
policies and then moving on to demanding dia-
logues or face-to-face defiance. Whatever
form it takes, direct action marks a significant
break from mediated contention. Its appea-
rance leads local cadres (and protesters them-
selves) into uncharted territory and introduces
new uncertainties, especially when activists
lose control of their followers or officials
panic. It also opens up the possibility that
rightful resisters will continue to escalate their
tactics (perhaps toward out-and-out violence)
while embracing broader and deeper claims
[Rucht 1990: 171-172] – claims that are ge-
neral and ideological rather than concrete and
specific [Tarrow 1989; Mueller 1999:
530-531], claims that challenge the legitimacy
of local government rather than the lawfulness
of particular decisions.
How New?
Techniques of protest are seldom invented out
of whole cloth. More often, they appear at the
edge of an existing repertoire of contention as
8. “Zhongguo Jiceng Zhengquan Jianshe Yanjiuhui,” in
“Zhongguo nongcun cunmin weiyuanhui huanjie xuanju
yanjiu baogao” (Research Report on Rural China’s Vil-
lagers’ Committee Reelections). Beijing, Zhongguo
shehui chubanshe, 1994. On six villagers seizing stuffed
ballot boxes, see “Six Chinese Farmers Jailed for De-
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“creative modifications or extensions of fami-
liar routines.” [Tilly 1993: 265-266; McAdam,
Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 49] Innovations, in this
way, signal a broadening of tactics and a gro-
wing strategic flexibility by activists who are
generating a multi-pronged strategy that can
be deployed on many fronts [McCann 1994:
86, 145; Rochon 1998: 202-203; Tarrow 1998:
37, 104; Andrews 2001: 77].
This is very much the story in rural China
today. Mediated tactics continue to be used
while direct, confrontational forms of conten-
tion have also become more common. Espe-
cially in locations where the old ways have
been found wanting again and again, nearly
contained acts are being augmented by deci-
dedly boundary-spanning or even transgres-
sive acts, as protesters begin to enforce central
directives themselves and literally use policies
as a weapon in their battles. As a researcher
from the Development Research Center of the
State Council put it:
“Contention within the system” (such as
petitioning) is still the main feature of
peasant action, but “contention outside
the system” (such as violence) is also ob-
viously increasing [...] Peasants start by
lodging complaints at the county level or
higher, and doing so at the province or in
Beijing is also fairly common [...] If the
petitions fail, they often turn to “direct”
resistance [Zhao 2004: 213, 221].
The repertoire of contention, in other words,
has expanded and some of the newer tunes are
becoming quite popular. Protest leaders in
places such as Hengyang are “stretching the
boundaries” of rightful resistance and are trying
to breathe life into a form of contention that had
been enjoying only limited success. In parti-
cular, they have established a “radical flank”
[McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 14] at a
time when it has become clear that the media-
tors they put their faith in are often ineffective
and local opponents are largely impervious to
half-hearted pressure from above.
How Widespread?
We can only speak with confidence, at this point,
about tactical escalation in Hengyang and a
handful of other counties. Moreover, there are
good reasons to believe that protest forms spread
slower in China than in more open polities where
the media deems dramatic, innovative tactics
newsworthy [Rochon 1988: 102-104; della Porta
and Diani 1999: 186] and rapidly transmits ac-
counts of them nationwide [Soule 1997: 858]. In
China, tactical diffusion still depends on word-
of-mouth and informal social networks.9
Complainants, in the course of lodging
complaints at higher levels (i.e. using mediated
tactics), encounter one another in reception
rooms, outside Letters and Visits Offices, and in
“petitioners’ camps,” and share stories of their
frustration with the old forms and victories with
the newer ones.10 Telephones enable protest
9. On the limited reach and generality of “diffusion”
compared to “brokerage,” see D. McAdam, S. Tarrow
and C. Tilly [2001: 335]. On “contagion effects” in rural
China, see T.P. Bernstein [2003].
10. On finding, at any given time, about 50,000 ag-
grieved individuals in a petitioners’ camp outside one of
the largest of Beijing’s complaints’ offices, see H. Beech
[2004]. “Training classes” run by some public intellec-
tuals in Beijing have also provided opportunities for rural
complainants to meet and discuss their experiences.
. . .
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organizers in different counties to stay in touch
and carry tales of inventive tactics far and
wide.11 Migrant workers bring word of popular
action in distant locales. Successful tactics
often draw a stream of activists from the sur-
rounding area to confer with “peasant heroes”
who have achieved what had seemed impos-
sible. Much as it has in other authoritarian
settings, “low-intensity forms of communica-
tion [...] enable rural agitators to learn their
trade, share experiences, and develop common
identities” away from official scrutiny and
interference [Euchner 1996: 150-151].
Direct rightful resistance spreads by imita-
tion; it can also become more common owing
to contemporaneous creation. Broadly similar
grievances and experiences with contention
can help forge a collective identity when li-
mited interpersonal contact establishes mi-
nimal identification between transmitters and
adopters [McAdam and Rucht 1993], or even
without any direct, relational ties [Strang and
Meyer 1993; Soule 1997: 861].12 And this col-
lective identity can inspire a wave of a similar
protests when a tactic becomes modular
[Tarrow 1998] and adroit practitioners either
import it wholesale or reinvent it (with perhaps
a local twist) to fit their particular situation
[Scalmer 2002].
To this point, Chinese researchers have un-
covered evidence of direct action in the pro-
vinces of Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Jiangxi,
Henan, Shaanxi, and Hebei [Yang 1999; Ding
2001; Yu 2001; Hao and Chen 2002; Xiao
2002; Zhao 2004]. Our interviews suggest that
direct rightful resistance may be particularly
well-developed in Dangshan county, Anhui,
Gushi county, Henan, and Fengcheng county,
Jiangxi. Furthermore, direct tactics in Hunan
have appeared not only in Hengyang, but also
in the counties of Lianyuan, Ningxiang,
Qidong, Taoyuan, Xiangyin, and Yizhang.
Origins of Direct Tactics
It is only a start to say that tactics wear out
“in the same way that rote speech falls flat”
[McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 138]. New
tactics are not a “blind reflex” [della Porta and
Diani 1999: 185] or an automatic response to
anything. They must be created through an in-
teractive process [Jasper 1997: 295; Tarrow
1998: 102] that entails “incessant improvisa-
tion on the part of all participants” [McAdam,
Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 138] and “a series of
reciprocal adjustments” [della Porta and Diani
11. According to a Chinese researcher, “some leading
figures among the peasantry have close ties with dozens
or even a hundred peasant complainants inside and out-
side the province. Sometimes they even assemble to dis-
cuss important matters.” [Zhao 2004: 7] On the “elaborate
organization” of many protests, including having desi-
gnated leaders, public spokespersons, underground core
groups, as well as hired lawyers and invited journalists to
cover their events, see M.S. Tanner [2004: 141].
12. Collective identities can be strengthened on the basis
of little more than a snippet of news. After the 1996
protests against education surcharges in Hezhou town,
Qidong county, Hunan, news of success spread rapidly
and other activists argued that elite solidarity was not as
great as it seemed, that villagers elsewhere should not
suffer more than those in Hezhou, and that other town-
ships were also vulnerable to direct tactics. One protest
leader rallied his followers with the words: “We are all
citizens of the People’s Republic. We live under the same
blue sky. Why do we have to pay this unlawful appor-
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1999: 186-187]. This depends on strategic de-
cisions by protest leaders and their foes, as
well as newly-available resources and changes
in the external environment. Most of all, in
rural China, it hinges on activists who reflect
on their earlier experiences with mediated tac-
tics, learn from their successes and failures,
and come up with perhaps brilliant, perhaps
ill-advised ways to pursue their ends the next
time around.13
In the following pages, we discuss four fac-
tors that have contributed to tactical escalation
in the Chinese countryside: 1) past defeats, 2)
information about government policies and as-
surances obtained during mediated contention,
3) advances in communications and informa-
tion technology, and 4) popular support for
disruptive protests.
DEFEATS
Defeat sometimes drives protest leaders under-
ground or spurs them to give up. It may also,
however, motivate them to up the ante and
touch off a round of tactical escalation. Recur-
ring failures can trigger thoughts about jetti-
soning ineffective tactics [Beckwith 2000;
McCammon et al. 2001] while the harsh poli-
cing often associated with defeat may usher
moderates into private life, leaving the stage
to those with more militant inclinations
[Tarrow 1998: 84-85, 150, 158, 201; della
Porta 1999: 89-90; della Porta and Diani 1999:
211].14 In rural China, a growing realization of
the inadequacy15 and riskiness of mediated tac-
tics has undermined the faith some activists
had in lodging complaints and has induced
them to take direct action.
For many long-time complainants, the
bitter truth is that protectors at higher levels
have too often shown themselves to be all
talk and little action. Anticipated backers fre-
quently turn out to be little more than a sym-
bolic source of legitimacy, who intervene
only when egregious wrongs threaten poli-
tical stability (such as after village cadres in
Henan killed a villager who persisted in pur-
suing complaints). In less incendiary cir-
cumstances, rightful resisters who employ
mediated tactics are commonly ignored,
given the run-around, or harassed. Even if
they do receive a favorable response from so-
meone in power, their antagonists at lower le-
vels often ignore “soft” instructions from
above or delay endlessly in implementing
them [O’Brien and Li 1999; Wedeman 2001;
Edin 2003; Whiting 2004: 119].
Defeats arise first and foremost because
mediators do not mediate. Delegations
13. On tactical virtuosi, see J.M. Jasper [1997: 301,
319-320].
14. In Hengyang in 1998, thirteen “burden-reduction re-
presentatives” were whittled down to six by threats le-
veled by a township government. Backed into a corner,
the remaining activists felt they either had to accept de-
feat or change their course of action. They decided to
press on and engage in direct action by publicizing the
Center’s effort to reduce farmers’ burdens to every
household in the township [Yu 2001: 555].
15. Our 1999 survey of 1,384 villagers in 25 pro-
vinces included 190 participants in collective com-
plaints. Of these 190, 3% were very satisfied with the
outcome of their action, 18% relatively satisfied, 24%
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languish for weeks waiting for an appointment
with leaders who never emerge. Oral sym-
pathy is not backed up with written instruc-
tions. Complainants are treated politely in
person and then undercut behind their backs.
The appearance of many open doors in Bei-
jing (e.g. Letters and Visits Offices at the
Central Committee, the Party Discipline Ins-
pection Committee, the National People’s
Congress, various ministries, People’s Daily,
Farmer’s Daily) and at lower levels can keep
hopes of mediated rightful resisters alive for
a while, but only intensifies their resentment
when they receive no response, are referred to
yet another office, or a complaint ends up in
the hands of the official charged with mis-
conduct (on “Letters and Visits”, see
T.P. Bernstein and X. Lü [2003: 177-190],
X. Chen [2003], L.M. Luehrmann [2003],
I. Thireau and L. Hua [2003], Y. Cai [2004]).16
According to a researcher from the Hunan
Organization Department:
People who visit higher levels to lodge
complaints very rarely obtain justice. Jus-
tice for them is like a carrot dangling in
front of a donkey. The donkey walks for
many kilometers but can never eat the
carrot [Cai 2003: 664, 679].
In the end, many veteran activists have
come to doubt the capacity of the Center to
ensure faithful policy implementation, and
some even think of it as a clay Buddha that
local officials must bow to but can ignore with
impunity [Li 2004]. All this has led to growing
frustration among protesters who had relied on
mediated tactics and has encouraged some of
them to find new ways to pursue their goals.
INFORMATION AND ASSURANCES
Despite its frequent failure to produce much re-
dress, mediated contention can generate re-
sources and create openings that promote direct
contention. Activists, most notably, have ob-
tained copies of authoritative “red-headed docu-
ments” via mediated contention that confirmed
policy violations were taking place. In Hengyang,
for instance, Hunan Provincial Regulation No. 9
(1996) on limiting exactions has played a large
part in helping activists pinpoint misconduct by
local officials. Such documents can be shown to
potential supporters to prove, in detailed and
clearly-worded language, that township and
county cadres have betrayed their superiors.
Some of these measures even authorize direct
action when central directives are ignored. A 1991
State Council Regulation, for example, states:
It is the obligation of farmers to remit
taxes to the state, to fulfill the state’s pro-
curement quotas for agricultural pro-
ducts, and to be responsible for the
various fees and services stipulated in
these regulations. Any other demands on
farmers to provide financial, material, or
labor contributions gratis are illegal and
farmers have the right to reject them
[cited in Bernstein and Lü 2003: 48].
16. Complainants are often rounded up and sent home
during annual People’s Congress sessions and at other
times when officials are busy announcing their achieve-
ments or showing off their city [Beech 2004]. Before the
2004 National People’s Congress, for example, the Mi-
nistry of Land and Resources issued an urgent circular
instructing local officials to use “firm and effective” mea-
sures to handle long-time complainants who were dispu-
ting land requisitions, and to “do everything possible to
stabilize the masses in their locality.”
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Even more authoritatively, the 1993 Agri-
culture Law (Art. 18) explicitly grants villa-
gers the right to refuse to pay illegal
impositions. It is true that these acts offer little
protection if rejecting a demand leads to de-
tention, a beating, having one’s home torn
down, or having one’s valuables or livestock
confiscated. Nor do they spell out punishments
for cadres who flout the limits. But this incom-
pleteness has only stimulated some protest lea-
ders to devise their own ways to make these
rights real. Among other initiatives, activists
in various provinces have organized mass mee-
tings to study and publicize the Agriculture
Law and provincial caps on taxation, and they
have openly challenged officials who fail to
comply with them [Ma 2000].
Participants in mediated contention also so-
metimes obtain oral or written assurances that
disseminating beneficial policies is legally pro-
tected. When several farmers in Hunan asked
whether they could publicize documents
concerning excessive fees, officials at the pro-
vincial Letters and Visits Office encouraged
them to do so, so that villagers knew what was
forbidden and what was not. On one occasion,
the Office director also reassured them that
such actions were lawful and jotted some sup-
portive remarks on the cover of a provincial
regulation he gave to the lead complainant.
Another Hengyang protest leader received si-
milar words of encouragement when he visited
the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing. More
remarkably, when several farmers lodged a
complaint at the Fujian provincial government
concerning a township’s illegal sale of farm-
land they had contracted, the staff member who
received them at the Letters and Visits Office
reassured them that they had the right to block
the purchaser from taking over the land. Acting
on a belief that they had located a “guarantor
against repression” [Tarrow 1998: 79], each of
these protest leaders then transformed a few
kind words (in fact, the only politically correct
response) into permission to pursue a broad-
based campaign of publicizing policies. In the
Fujian case, villagers also went a step further:
they took the official’s advice literally and phy-
sically blocked the land buyer’s men when they
came to claim the property.
Strictly speaking, there is no law that al-
lows Chinese citizens to publicize Party poli-
cies and state laws. But this is an act whose
correctness no one can legitimately challenge.
While an official who scrawls on a letter of
complaint “disseminating policies is protected
by law” may be seeking mainly to get a group
of activists out of his or her office and to dis-
courage them from returning [Guo 2001: 434],
enterprising activists often waste little time ex-
panding this discursive crack into a window of
opportunity. They interpret official “instruc-
tions,” as informal and off-hand as they usually
are, to be evidence that a meaningful gap exists
between authorities at higher and lower levels.
What might have been little more than a brush-
off, in other words, can easily justify upgra-
ding a general license to publicize policies into
an explicit go-ahead to challenge abusive local
officials and mobilize opposition to unlawful
decisions in one’s own village.
In sum, even though mediated contention
usually fails to generate the hoped-for relief,
it can provide activists with crucial informa-
tion about official misconduct, suggest poli-
tical openings (that may or may not exist), and
. . .
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(by changing protest leaders’ expectations and




Some activists in rural China use remarkably
low-tech (or no-tech) means to mobilize and
coordinate direct action. In Jize county, Hebei,
for example, protest leaders set off firecrackers
to assemble villagers in front of a general store
before leading them to demand a dialogue with
township leaders, while in Hunan village look-
outs used gongs to summon community mem-
bers to defend protest organizers who were
about to be arrested.
But some newer technologies (which have
only recently reached the countryside) have
played an even bigger role in facilitating direct
rightful resistance. We have already seen how
audio equipment such as tape recorders, loud-
speakers, and mobile broadcasting stations can
help publicize policies and rally supporters. In-
somuch as direct action requires considerable
coordination and planning, telephones have
also become an important tool for protest lea-
ders. More and more activists these days use
mobile phones to arrange multi-village or even
multi-township actions. In Hengyang, for ins-
tance, one farmer set up a telephone tree that
connected hundreds of activists in nearly a
dozen townships. Many of his fellow organi-
zers now have cell phones or land lines at
home; those who do not, rely on neighbors who
are willing to pass on messages about the time
and place of meetings, upcoming actions, the
number of protesters to turn out, and so on. In
Hunan, villagers have even used mobile
phones to protect investigators who have come
to do research on rural contention. One protest
leader called two journalists sent by the ma-
gazine Window on the South Wind (Nanfeng
Chuang) to warn them (three times) to change
taxis after his followers discovered that county
officials had learned the license plate number
of their vehicle; later, after the reporters stayed
in one location too long and were detained,
another activist phoned to offer to mobilize
hundreds of villagers to free them [Bernstein
2003; Johnson 2004: 69].
Personal computers are another break-
through that has promoted the use of direct tac-
tics. Computer printing, in particular, can aid
both in publicizing policies and reproducing
letters of complaints. Activists in Anhui pro-
vince, for instance, painstakingly entered a be-
neficial tax policy on a computer, character by
character, and then distributed printouts to stir
up resistance to unlawful taxation. Shortly be-
fore a number of “burden reduction representa-
tives” in Hengyang demanded a dialogue with
a school head concerning tuition and fee in-
creases, they circulated printouts of their letter
of complaint to parents of school children.
Most of these newer technologies are no
longer forbiddingly expensive. Mobile phones
can be bought for 200 to 300 yuan (approxi-
mately US $25-$40) and calls run about 60 fen
(7 US cents) or less per minute. Shops that
provide word-processing and computer prin-
ting can be found in virtually all county towns
and many townships.
The technology that has transformed pro-
test the most is also one of the most widely
available: photocopying. In Hunan, it costs 30
fen (4 US cents) to reproduce a page the size
. . .
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of this one and copy shops can be found in
most township seats. Photocopying not only
eases duplication of central, provincial and
city regulations, it also lends a patina of au-
thenticity and legitimacy to those documents
and impedes crackdowns by officials who pre-
viously would have claimed they were bogus.
In Hengyang, when a deputy township head
and the chair of the township People’s
Congress attempted to shut down a group of
activists who were reading copied regulations
over a loudspeaker and alleged that they were
publicizing phony “black documents,” several
activists challenged them to produce the real
or “red” versions. Rebuffed, the officials had
nothing more to say. The protest leaders then
immediately announced to the surrounding
crowd that these officials were “active
counter-revolutionaries” because they had
“defiled” central policies.
All these technologies enable adept rightful
resisters to reach out to (and fire up) a mass
constituency in a way that was less critical
when they were simply lodging mass
complaints and depended largely on elite allies
rather than disgruntled, agitated villagers. Ad-
vances in duplication and communication
(with faxes, e-mail, text-messaging, and the in-
ternet not far behind) [Tarrow 1998: 132; on
Falun Gong, see Thornton 2002] also help or-
ganizers mount popular action and gauge how
disruptive they can be without crossing into
“forbidden zones.”
POPULAR SUPPORT
In rural China today, there is not much evi-
dence of a “strategic dilemma” where disrup-
tion is necessary to draw attention but
militancy reliably alienates the public [Rochon
1988; Jasper 1997: 9, 13]. So long as rightful
resisters refrain from demanding excessive do-
nations or harassing free-riders, tactical esca-
lation usually generates more community
approval than disapproval. Particularly in lo-
cations where villagers have become exaspe-
rated with the Center’s failure to rectify
long-standing wrongs, unconventional tactics
do not undermine the legitimacy of protest and
drive away supporters, but more often lead to
comments such as:
When officials push people to rebel,
people have to resist.
Direct tactics can help a group of activists
expand their base by creating solidarity, for-
ging a collective identity, and strengthening
trust. It is often the case that the more assertive
and enterprising protest leaders are, the more
their stature rises – though popular acclaim
does not always translate into active participa-
tion in the next round of contention. As we
will see in Chapter 5, interested onlookers so-
metimes join protests or become leaders them-
selves; more frequently, they offer financial
support or applaud the actions of activists
whom they have come to respect or even ad-
mire. In this way, although direct tactics esta-
blish a “radical flank,” they do not redound
chiefly to the benefit of those who employ mo-
derate, mediated tactics. Instead, they often set
in motion a sequence of events where wary but
hopeful spectators (and some new participants)
are delighted to see imperious, corrupt, and
abusive officials get their comeuppance and
even privately egg rightful resisters to ratchet
the level of confrontation up a notch.
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The following episode illustrates how the
back-and-forth between protest leaders and their
followers can lead to tactical escalation. In Shan-
dong, an elected village director lodged nume-
rous complaints and even filed a lawsuit against
an accountant who was the front-man for a cor-
rupt village Party secretary. But the director
could not secure access to the accounts that
confirmed the financial shenanigans of the two
men. (To shield their underlings and themselves
township officials had spirited away the account
books to their office and locked them up.) In
2002, with a new election approaching, the di-
rector realized that he might lose, largely be-
cause he had been so ineffective in bringing the
Party secretary and the accountant to justice. His
supporters were concerned and urged him to use
bolder, direct tactics. The director demanded a
meeting with the township head, during which
he threatened, if he was again prevented from
seeing the accounts, to mobilize his following to
occupy the township office building. The
township head relented but only granted permis-
sion to review the books for a single day. The
director agreed but decided to spring a surprise.
At the end of the appointed time, nearly 60 of his
supporters suddenly appeared, seized the ac-
counts, and ran off with them. This incident led
the township leadership and the village Party
secretary to cancel the upcoming election, the-
reby allowing the village director to retain his
position. It also helped the director win back
many of his former backers who had been
disappointed with his lack of resolve.
Popular support for direct tactics arises for a
number of reasons. Above all, it derives from
widespread frustration with the ineffectiveness
of mediated contention. Of nearly equal
importance, participating in direct rightful resis-
tance, or offering financial or moral support to
those who do so, is not as risky as it might seem.
Since their ham-fisted involvement in suppres-
sing the 1989 protest movement, China’s secu-
rity forces have become much more concerned
with the misuse of force. The police increa-
singly seek “to minimize popular anger through
more moderate policing of protests” [Tanner
2004: 148] and rely on containment and mana-
gement rather than deterrence and quick sup-
pression. This shift has meant that many
low-key protests are permitted to continue (and
crowds allowed to disperse), with little danger to
most participants [id.]. Moreover, from impe-
rial days to the present, protest leaders have al-
ways paid the highest price when collective
action backfired, while followers have been pro-
tected by their numbers, their relative anony-
mity, and the authorities’ fear of alienating a
broad swath of the population. In fact, a
common outcome has been arrest and imprison-
ment of ringleaders followed by concessions on
the subject of the protesters’ demands [Bianco
2001; O’Brien 2002: 150; Bernstein and Lü
2003].17 In some senses, taking part in a de-
monstration is even less dangerous than partici-
pating in typical mediated tactics, such as
openly identifying oneself by signing or thumb
printing a collective letter of complaint. While
direct tactics require considerable planning and
coordination, and place protest leaders in no
small jeopardy, they also often ease the job of
amassing and retaining popular support.
17. On the high risks leaders of collective appeals typi-
cally face, see Y. Cai [2004: 447-448].
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Who Innovates?
In many countries, new tactics are associated
with new activists [Jasper 1997: 231, 241;
della Porta and Diani 1999: 189] – with suc-
cessive “micro-cohorts” [Whittier 1995: 56]
who enter a movement often after working in
another movement [Meyer and Whittier 1994;
Voss and Sherman 2000: 328]. Although in
rural China we see some of this, particularly
among new recruits who took part in mass
campaigns during the waning days of the
Maoist era, our limited evidence suggests that
tactical escalation is mainly the handiwork of
seasoned complainants who have learned new
tricks as their abilities, resources and commit-
ment have grown. In Hengyang, for instance,
all 32 protest leaders on whom we have infor-
mation had been involved in collective action
for at least eight years, and all of them em-
ployed mediated tactics before moving on to
direct action.18
Of course, long-time complainants do not
always graduate to direct rightful resistance.
Those who do, in Hengyang, have typically
been middle-aged or slightly older men who
say they feel boxed in, in that they have few
other options to improve their economic, so-
cial or political position. A number of Heng-
yang protest leaders who were under 35 years
of age simply left the countryside and became
migrant workers after a multi-village, collec-
tive complaint in 1996 failed to produce any
relief. Older complainants however, could not
easily do the same, not least because they often
had elderly parents and teenage children to
look after. Some of these men had also been
migrant workers themselves for a time, but
were unwilling to relive the discrimination and
exploitation they had experienced. Others had
served in the army and found themselves
locked out of the village leadership when they
returned home (on veterans and rural protest,
see K.J. O’Brien and L. Li [1995: 758],
T.P. Bernstein and X. Lü [2003: 148-149],
J. Yu [2003: 1]).19 After years of fruitless me-
diated contention, most felt they had no alter-
native to escalation, unless they were willing
to discard their ambitions, their self-respect,
and their hopes for a better life.
Personal, psychological factors also help
explain why some veteran complainants have
adopted direct tactics. Most of the innovators
we have encountered are unusually assertive
and self-confident characters, who, for
example, enjoyed telling anyone who would
listen how much pride they took in fighting
wrongdoing.20 Along these lines, one activist
in Hengyang said:
18. On protest in Hengyang in the late 1980s and early
1990s, see T.P. Bernstein and X. Lü [2003: 187-189] and
J. Yu [2003].
19. Our 1999-2001 survey of 1,600 villagers in 4 coun-
ties (2 in Jiangxi, 1 in Jiangsu, and 1 in Fujian) [Li 2004:
244] showed that both men and army veterans were
considerably overrepresented among rightful resisters.
This survey did not distinguish between mediated and
direct forms of rightful resistance.
20. E.J. Wood [2003: 234-237] highlights the “pleasures
in agency” experienced by many participants in collec-
tive action. Her study of insurgency in El Salvador
showed that feelings of increased autonomy, self-esteem
and pride came about “in the course of making history,
and not just any history but a history they perceived as
more just.” (P. 235)
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I have been combative since I was young
and have no tolerance for injustice and evil.
Another protest leader from Hengyang was
proud to announce:
I have been rebelling against abusive cadres
since Mao Zedong was still ruling China.21
Indeed, several rural organizers even
compared themselves to vaunted Party martyrs
and vowed that they would rather die than
knuckle under to unjust and corrupt local of-
ficials. One activist from Lianyuan county,
Hunan, went so far as to allude to the famous
Qin dynasty rebels Chen Sheng and Wu Guang
by claiming:
Kings and generals are not born to be
kings and generals.
These diehards not only refuse to retreat,
they also have no use for tactics that have re-
peatedly shown themselves to be inadequate.
For protest leaders with such hard-charging
personalities, disenchantment with mediated
contention only feeds their indignation, brinks-
manship, and dreams of grandeur while boos-
ting their commitment to find a way to do
whatever it takes to prevail.
That many rightful resisters possess strong
personalities and no lack of self-esteem also
means that they are likely to find it humiliating
to let their supporters down. Tactical innova-
tors in rural China are typically highly attuned
to questions of dignity and “face” and believe
(often correctly) that they will be mocked as
cowards if they back down after a few setbacks
[Yu 2001: 568].22 This is especially true when
protest leaders have openly vowed to defend
their neighbors to the end and have repeatedly
solicited contributions from the public to lodge
complaints. As time goes by, they often feel
growing pressure to find a way, any way, to
deliver at least a portion of what they have
promised. They wish to show that they have
the mettle to stand up to the authorities for as
long as it takes and to demonstrate that their
acts of defiance will ultimately have a payoff.
Lastly, architects of direct rightful resis-
tance seem to possess an abiding faith in the
Center’s desire (if not capacity) to halt policy
violations. They appreciate better than most
that officials up to the province level are un-
likely to redress popular grievances, yet they
continue to say that some leaders at the Center
truly wish to end misimplementation of bene-
ficial measures [Guo 2001: 435-437; Li 2004].
In the words of a protest leader from Fujian:
Central leaders share a common interest
with people like me, at least to the extent
that they agree that what I’m struggling
against also undermines Party rule.
Similarly, although an activist from Shan-
dong repeatedly dodged questions about whe-
ther he genuinely trusted the Center, he insisted
that so long as China’s President wished to stay
in power, he would need people like him to
help control wayward local officials. For such
individuals, declining trust in the Center’s
21. On the persistence and reputation for courage of pro-
test leaders, see T.P. Bernstein [2003].
22. For rumors that he had been bribed by a county go-
vernment leading an activist to begin a campaign of pu-
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capacity does not cause a lapse into passivity;
instead, it strengthens their resolve and encou-
rages them to step up their efforts to assist a
besieged and weakened Center.
Some Implications
Rightful resistance has evolved in rural China.
Some long-time activists, seeing few alterna-
tives and too proud to accept defeat, have
turned to more confrontational forms of
contention. Instead of counting on higher-level
patrons to address their claims, these rightful
resisters and their followers have increasingly
come to demand justice on the spot. In an at-
tempt to halt policy violations, they have trans-
formed tiny openings into opportunities to
deploy new, more disruptive tactics, such as
publicizing policies, demanding dialogues, and
face-to-face defiance. In the course of doing
so, they have exploited the spread of commu-
nications and information technologies, inclu-
ding mobile phones, photocopying, and
computerized printing. Direct tactics, to this
point, have generally not overstepped the
Center’s sufferance (so long as protest leaders
and their followers stop short of violence and
clearly illegal acts), and they almost always
meet with popular acclaim, as rightful resisters
persist, win occasional victories, and keep
trumpeting their willingness to sacrifice all for
the interests of the Party and the people.
These developments have several broader
implications for research on contentious poli-
tics. Tactical escalation, it should be noted, has
brought about what D. McAdam, S. Tarrow and
C. Tilly [2001: 144-158] call “object shift,” in
two different senses. On the one hand, the focus
of rightful resistance has shifted downwards,
since direct contention is usually aimed at lower
level officials than mediated contention. Local
adversaries are confronted not bypassed. Protes-
ters give up on high-level patrons and take mat-
ters into their own hands. On the other hand,
rightful resisters sometimes turn on their inef-
fectual (or two-faced) advocates at higher levels
and attack them. Consider this example from
Hengyang: after a protest organizer’s wife was
beaten by township cadres and several hired
toughs, another activist led a delegation of villa-
gers to the county to insist that the perpetrators
be punished. At this point, the protesters were
employing mediated tactics because they treated
the county as a potential ally against their
township foes. But when the county head sum-
marily rejected their demands, the activists de-
cided that the county was in truth a backstage
supporter of their antagonists. Instead of procee-
ding up a level to the city government (which
they still considered an ally), they decided they
would challenge the county itself by setting up a
human blockade on a county highway. As their
perception of the county’s stance changed, their
tactics had morphed from mediated contention
(aimed at the county, by appealing to it for help)
to direct action (against the county, by blocking
the county road). So far, direct contention has
mostly targeted township and village cadres;
this episode shows it can move up the hierarchy,
with potentially explosive consequences.
The “addressees” [Szabo 1996] of conten-
tion have changed in another important way.
In rural China, the audience for collective ac-
tion is broadening well beyond fair-weather
friends in officialdom. Rightful resisters now
regularly turn to another third party – the pu-
blic. The strategic dilemma that researchers
. . .
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have observed in the West [Rochon 1988;
Jasper 1997: 9, 13; della Porta and Diani 1999:
182-183] can easily be overstated in the Chi-
nese countryside, where radicalism typically
attracts support rather than chases it away.
Many of our interviewees in fact believe that
protest organizers should have acted earlier
and even more dramatically. This is a good
reminder that tactical escalation is often as
much about building a protest subculture as
winning battles [Jasper 1997: 237] and that we
need to peer deep inside protest groups to un-
derstand how internal solidarity is built and
collective identities form [della Porta and
Diani 1999: 181-182]. This implies more at-
tention to recruitment and leader-group dyna-
mics, and further consideration of the ways in
which tactical choices can “widen the circle of
those psychologically prepared for mobiliza-
tion” [Rochon 1998: 162], play a role in knit-
ting a group together, and “reinforce affective
ties among protesters.” [Jasper 1997: 237]
The evolution of rightful resistance also
suggests how political opportunities can fi-
gure in tactical escalation. Yes, some sympa-
thetic officials have provided rightful resisters
information about beneficial policies and as-
surances that it is safe and advisable to go
beyond lodging complaints.23 But often more
significant than new openings has been the
inability of protesters to locate allies who will
stick with them to the end. Activists have
learned that they must rely on themselves and
their constituency more, both for protection
and to prevail. Their advocates at higher le-
vels have often shown themselves to be vir-
tual allies at best, and this has altered the costs
and benefits of different forms of contention.
Seen in this light, whether opportunities have
expanded or contracted depends on the tactics
under consideration. Tactical escalation in
rural China thus hinges less on whether the
system is open or closed [Kitschelt 1986: 66]
than on which doors are opening and closing.
The key question, as we saw in Chapter 2, is
“opportunity for what?” [Meyer and Minkoff
2004: 1461-1463, 1484] It has not been an im-
proving political opportunity structure24 but a
shifting one that has undermined mediated
rightful resistance and promoted direct
rightful resistance.
At the same time, tactical innovation re-
quires that skillful activists seize available op-
portunities [McAdam 1983: 737; Jasper
1997].25 Protest leaders may understand or mis-
understand their situation, and then devise
brilliant or foolish moves.26 In the Chinese
23. On expanding opportunities and tactical innovation,
see D. McAdam [1983: 737], M. Szabo [1996] and
D.C. Minkoff [1999].
24. For definitions of “political opportunity structure”
that underscore political openings, rifts among elites,
elite allies, and the state’s capacity for repression, see
D. McAdam et al. [2001: 27] and S. Tarrow [1998: 71].
25. On political opportunity structures as “a system of
permissive incentives rather than of firm constraints,” see
T.R. Rochon [1998: 203].
26. Tactics are also chosen partly for psychological,
cultural, and biographical reasons. They express moral
visions and identities. Activists may find some certain
tactics enjoyable and others dull. Protest leaders may
have their self-image tied up in being at the cutting edge.
For these and other reasons, tactical choices can diverge
from what an opportunity structure would predict. See
J.M. Jasper [1997: 244-245, 301, 320].
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countryside, a growing realization that most of
their anticipated allies are missing in action
has demoralized less committed activists and
encouraged more assertive protesters to search
for new, more effective tactics. After repeated
failures, some rightful resisters have developed
a new (perhaps more realistic) appreciation of
the openings and threats they face, and have
adjusted their tactics accordingly. Crises, tur-
bulence and shocks (brought on mainly by de-
feats), and the response of activists to them has
precipitated tactical escalation [Beckwith
2000; Voss and Sherman 2000: 341]. Through
a long and bumpy process of experimentation,
protesters in different locations have groped
their way from mediated to direct contention.
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Résumé
Kevin J. O’Brien et Li Lianjiang, « Escalade tactique »
dans la Chine rurale
L’archétype de la résistance légitime, c’est le dépôt d’une
requête collective auprès de l’administration. Mais que
se passe-t-il si la requête est ignorée ? Certains protesta-
taires de longue date, face au peu d’alternatives qui s’of-
frent à eux, et trop fiers pour renoncer, adoptent des
formes plus directes d’opposition : porter à la connais-
sance de tous les termes des mesures politiques, exiger
des débats, affronter face à face les responsables locaux.
Ces actions directes représentent une rupture par rapport
aux formes de résistance légitimes qui passent par la mé-
diation, dans la mesure où ceux qui mènent les protesta-
tions, loin de se contenter de rapporter les violations
commises, essayent d’y mettre un terme en en appelant
aux communautés locales autant qu’aux autorités supé-
rieures. Cette « escalade tactique » résulte d’une trans-
formation des opportunités et nous rappelle que le fait de
considérer que les opportunités sont plus ou moins nom-
breuses dépend en réalité des tactiques adoptées.
Mots clés
communauté rurale, confrontations directes, tactiques de
résistance, protestataires
Abstract
Kevin J. O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, Tactical Escalation
in Rural China
Petitioning is the archetypal form of rightful resistance.
But what if a petition falls on deaf ears? Some long-time
protesters, seeing few alternatives and too proud to ac-
cept defeat, have turned to three more direct forms of
confrontation: publicizing policies, demanding dialo-
gues, and face-to-face confrontations with local officials.
Direct action signals a break with more mediated forms
of resistance, since protest leaders, rather than reporting
a policy violation, try to stop it by appealing to the
community as much as to higher authorities. This “tac-
tical escalation” is a consequence of shifting opportuni-
ties and a reminder that any assessment of whether
opportunities have expanded or contracted depends on
the tactics adopted.
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